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NOTES
A

STUDY IN THE CONFLICT OF FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY: DISPARATE LABOR AND JURISDICTION POLICIES

Introduction
The purpose of this article is to discuss two inherently incompatible attitudes which have been manifested by the federal judiciary
and Congress toward state courts and administrative agencies. Since
1793 there has existed, in one form or another, a provision in the
Judicial Code disabling federal courts from enjoining state proceedings.' Although attempts have been made to avoid it, 2 evade
it, 3 and in one or two instances, ignore it, 4 the broad prohibition
has remained entrenched in the law without significant legislative
qualification.
On the other hand, when a sufficient federal interest has been
shown, such as that shown in the field of labor relations, Congress
has gone to the opposite extreme and completely divested the states
of any and all jurisdiction in the matter, thereby pre-empting the
field. Thus, while the states can be said to enjoy a sacrosanct status
with regard to one phase of their relationship with their federal
counterpart, in the other instance they enjoy no status at all. In
addition to the incongruity just mentioned, myriad problems have
arisen within the separate areas themselves making proper judicial
determination that much more difficult.
Solutions to these problems have been attempted and have at
best enjoyed only partial success. Section 2283 of the Judicial
Code, enacted in 1948 to clarify the position of Congress in an
ideological battle which had been waged in the Supreme Court some
seven years earlier, fell far short of its purpose; 5 the Labor' The statutory genesis of the provision is as follows: Act of Mar. 2,
1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335; REv. STAT. (1878) ch. 12, § 720; Act of Mar. 3,
1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 379 (1940). The provision is

currently embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958) and will be discussed at length
2 See note 30 infra.
3 See notes 20-24 infra.
- See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
5 Section 2283 was enacted in 1948. The "ideological battle" took place in
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941).

infra.
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Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 6 apparently
solves at least one problem (jurisdictionally speaking) but makes
no attempt to settle some of the more basic issues.
The Early Prohibition and Necessary Exceptions

The first version of the prohibition was deceptively simple:
. nor shall a writ of injunction be granted [by any court of the
United States] to stay proceedings in any court of a state . . . . "
The statute is believed to be the product of the efforts of two men,
Edmund Randolph and John Jay. In 1790, Attorney General
Randolph requested Congress to pass a bill which would debar federal district courts from "interfering with the judgments at law in
the state courts," 8 and two years later, Chief Justice Jay requested
a similar provision for the benefit of his colleagues who were tiring
of the rigors incident to eighteenth century circuit riding.9 Passed
in what has been aptly labelled a "states' rights setting," 10 there is
no evidence of any difficulties encountered by the bill in passage. In
fact, the bill may well have been welcomed by Federalists and states'
rights advocates alike; by the latter for obvious reasons, and by the
former as a concession to a debtor class unenthusiastic in ratifying
a Federalist-sponsored Constitution."- In addition, the provision,
which is a limitation on the equity powers of the federal courts rather
than a limitation on their jurisdiction, 12 is consistent with a general
prejudice against equity practice which was prevalent at the time. 13
This could be mere coincidence, but there is some evidence that some
of those responsible for the successful passage of the bill
were also
4
among those who were disdainful of chancery practice.'
673 Stat. 519 (14 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2953 (1959)), hereinafter cited as Landrum-Griffin.
7 Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335.

s See Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HAv. L. REv.
345, 347 (1930).
9 See Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings itState Courts, 42 YAi.E L.J. 1169, 1170 (1933).
20 Durfee and Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State
Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MIcH. L. Rav. 1145, 1146 (1932).
"1See RODELL, NINE MEN 33-71 (1955).
12 Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274 (1924): "[The prohibition] . . . merely
limits their general equity powers in respect to the granting of a particular
form of equitable relief. . . . [The court's decision] . . . is plainly not a
decision upon a jurisdictional issue but upon the question whether there is or
is not equity in the particular bill. . . " Id. at 279-80. But see Ex parte
Schwab, 98 U.S. 240, 242 (1878) (dictum).
13 See Taylor and Willis, supra note 9, at 1171.
See also Warren, New
Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv.L. REv.
49, 96-101 (1923) (prejudice against equity seen in the debates connected with
the passage of § 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789).
14 Senator (later Chief Justice) Ellsworth was an important member of
the Senate committee that reported out the bill which became the Act of 1793
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Unquestionably, the prohibition serves to avoid "needless friction" 15 and "inevitable conflicts" 16 of jurisdiction between state and
federal courts, but it may also be borne in mind that the provision
has served some pragmatic and worldly causes as well as it has
vindicated any lofty notions of federal-state relations, and that courts
the prohibition have not necessarily been
in deciding cases involving
7
unmindful of that fact.'
Although the provision was used sparingly for over half a
century, 18 it became evident upon subsequent repeated usage that
qualifications to the broad mandate of the statute would have to be
made. These qualifications, or exceptions as they are called, fell
into three categories: those specifically enumerated in the statute
itself,19 those implied from the content of other statutes passed subsequent to the prohibition, 20 and the judicial exceptions. 2 ' The jusand he is believed to have had a pronounced aversion to chancery practice.

See Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings
in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169, 1171 (1933).
15 Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9
(1939). Accord, Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939).
16 Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915).
17 See Taylor and Willis, supra note 14, at 1194. As a vindication of an
abstract concept of federalism, in Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R, 200
U.S. 273 (1906), the Court called § 265 a "partial accomplishment of the more
comprehensive result effectuated by the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 292.
1s Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HAzv. L. Rgv. 345,
348 (1930).
19 The only exception written into the statute prior to 1948 was the exception for bankruptcy proceedings. The section was amended to read: "The
writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to
stay proceedings in any Court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."
36 Stat. 1162 (1911).
20 These implied legislative exceptions have covered rather small areas.
The statutes which have been given this effect are: removal statutes (currentry 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958) ; for prior versions see Warren, supra note 18,
at 369 n.121), an act limiting the liability of shipowners (Act of Mar. 3, 1851,
ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635; see Providence & New York S.S. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109
U.S. 578 (1883)), statutory interpleader (28 U.S.C. §2361 (1958)), and the
Frazier-Lemke Act, 62 Stat. 198 (1948), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §203 (1958),
a New Deal enactment designed to aid indigent farmers; see Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1958) (habeas corpus),
Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1958),
Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, 56 Sfat. 23 (1942), Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79(k) (1958),
construed in Okn v. SEC, 161 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1947), and In re United
Gas21Corp., 162 F2d 409 (3d Cir. 1947).
It should be mentioned that the judicial exceptions, the largest group
and by far the most confiising, are not susceptible to easy classification.
Compare the treatment given the judicial exceptions in the following commentaries: Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YAiE L.J. 1169 (1933); Durfee and Sloss,
Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts: The Life History
of a Statute, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 1145 (1932); Warren, supra note 18; Con-
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tification for these exceptions (except those specifically authorized)
lies in a familiar rule of comity that when a court properly takes
jurisdiction of a cause it should be allowed to reach a determination
without interference from another tribunal.12 So that if an action
were removed to a federal court, the federal court could enjoin the
parties from seeking redress in a state court on the ground that the
federal court could aid its jurisdiction." Even without statutory
authorization, i.e., a removal statute, the courts felt constrained to
grant an exception where a federal court had obtained prior 24 in rem
jurisdiction 25 of a cause, placing reliance on the same theory. The
doctrine, however, was extended to include cases in which the res
had passed out of the hands of the federal court, 26 and cases in which
only constructive possession had been obtained.27 Moreover, the
exception was granted in instances where the res itself was not readily
identifiable .2
Of course, if a state court had first assumed jurisdiction, the injunction would be denied.2 9
Exceptions were also granted in cases where a party sought to
enforce a void or inequitable judgment,30 cases in which a party atment, Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in State Courts, 35 CAL.
REv. 545 (1947).

L.

22 The purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict. See, e.g., Covell v. Heyman,
111 U.S. 176 (1884); Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3"Wall.) 334 (1865); Taylor
v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1857); Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
612 (1849).

23 See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McCabe, 213 U.S. 207 (1909); Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905); Dietzsch
-v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494 (1880); French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 238

(1874).
24

A federal court can enjoin state action if its purpose is to protect or

make effective its prior jurisdiction; in this sense the injunction is said to be

"ancillary."

If, however, the injunction is the business, or a part thereof, of

the first resort to the federal court, it will be denied. Compare Diggs &
Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807), with French v. Hay, note
23 supra.
25 The exception will not be granted for actions in personam. See Kline
v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922): ". . . [W]here the gction first
brought is in personamn and seeks only a personal judgment, another action

for the same cause in another jurisdiction is not precluded." Id. at 230. The
Court in this case felt that only a possible interference with a court's physical
control ovei a res would warrant the exception:

"But a controversy is not

a thing, and a controversy over a mere question of personal liability does not
involve the possession or control of a thing, and an action brought to enforce
-such a liability does not tend to impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court
in which a prior action for the same cause is pending." Ibid.
26See Wabash

R

v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 38 (1908); Julian v.

•Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904).
27 See Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36 (1928).
28
See, e.g., Looney v. Eastern Texas R., 247 U.S. 214 (1918) ; Gunter
v. Atlantic Coast Line tLRR, 200 U.S. 273 (1906).
29Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77 (1923); Palmer v.
'Texas, 212 U.S. 118 (1909).
30 See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924);

Essanay Film Mfg. Co. v. Kane, 258 U.S. 358 (1922); Wells Fargo & Co.
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tempted to enforce a statute repugnant to the Constitution, 3 1 and
cases where the United States itself was a party in interest. 32 Doubtless it was this judicial munificence in granting exceptions which
has led more than one author to comment, in a derogatory manner,
on the usefulness and significance of the statute.33 In no other area
of the law were the words of Chief Justice Hughes (". . . the Constitution is what the judges say it is . . .") more meaningful or ap-

propriate, for whether or not an exception would be granted in an
individual case became contingent upon the exigencies of that particular case, and perhaps upon the political climate and predisposition
of the Court rendering the decision, more
than on anything Congress
34
had said or failed to say on the matter.
The problems inherent in "judicial legislation" were illustrated
in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.35

The respondent executed

a deed of trust conveying all of its property to secure a bond issue
and the trustees filed a bill of foreclosure in the federal District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa. One of the respondent's stockholders intervened as a party defendant, alleging that the bonds and
v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920) ; Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915) ;
Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891). But see Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S.
393, 403 (1935) ; Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in
State Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 Mica. L. Ray. 1145, 1157
(1932). This exception is predicated on the proposition that the enforcement
of a judgment (void or otherwise) is not a "proceeding" within the meaning
of the statute; the proceeding is considered to have ended when judgment is
reached. Therefore, properly speaking, this class of cases forms no exception
to the statute at all because they are considered never to have come within
the purview of the prohibition at all. They "avoid" it rather than "evade" it.
Cf. Western Union Tel. v. Tompa, 51 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1931).
31 Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939) ; Missouri v. Chicago,
B. & Q.R.R., 241 U.S. 533 (1916); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915);
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
32Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957); United
States v. Inaba, 291 Fed. 416 (E.D. Wash. 1923). This exception is permitted on the theory that since sovereigns have immunity, by not disallowing
the prohibition of § 265, the effect would be to force the sovereign, indirectly,
to appear in a state court to defend its rights, and, hence, make the immunity
meaningless. See Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin
Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169, 1192 (1933).
33 See Taylor and Willis, supra note 32, at 1194. "To say that the statute
merely enacts a doctrine of comity which already existed, and that the limitations on that doctrine may therefore be enforced though not in terms included
in the enactment, is little more than a circumlocution announcing that the
statute will be departed from whenever, in the judgment of the court, necessity or convenience invites the departure . . . . [T]he limitations which the
courts have placed upon the statute are now so crystallized that discussion of
their intrinsic merit is purely academic." Ibid. See also Durfee & Sloss,
supra note 30, at 1169. ". . . [I] f Congress should repeal the statute and so
furnish us a laboratory for comparative study of the practice with and without
that legislation, we would find that . . . the statute has long been dead." Ibid.
34 See note 33 supra. Cf. RODELL, NINE MEN (1955).
35 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
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mortgage were fraudulent and without consideration, and the petitioner, holder of ninety per cent of the bonds and joined as party
plaintiff, denied all allegations of fraud. The court denied foreclosure on the grounds that the issue was fraudulent and without
consideration. The petitioner thereafter began five separate suits
in the Delaware state courts seeking recovery on various notes
and contracts which purportedly represented consideration for the
bonds. The respondent thereupon filed a "supplemental bill" in
a federal district court to enjoin the plaintiff from readjudicating
the issues settled by the federal decree.3 6 The issue was whether
"relitigation cases" were among the exceptions to section 265,37 or
whether the defendant would be forced to plead res judicata in the
second action.
The Court failed to agree on the precedents and the judicial
history of the section. The majority, through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, insisted on the literal interpretation of the statute and by
summarily dismissing a "sporadic, ill-considered decision," 38 arrived
at the conclusion that the res exception was the only permissible judicial exception because of its "uninterrupted and firmly established
acceptance." 39 Noting that section 265 had never been subject to
any comprehensive legislative re-examination, the majority refused
to construe congressional silence as a tacit request for another
exception.
It is indulging in the merest fiction to suggest that the doctrine which for the
first time we are asked to pronounce with our eyes open and in the light of
full consideration, was so obviously and firmly part of the texture of our law
that Congress in effect enacted it through its silence. ....The explicit and
comprehensive policy of the Act of 1793 has been left intact. To find sigunder these circumstances is to find
nificance in Congressional nonaction
significance where there is none.40

The minority disagreed in every respect with the majority. In
addition to relying on the precedent which had been impeached by
Justice Frankfurter,41 this opinion interpreted the silence of Congress
38The facts as they appear are the facts of the companion case, Phoenix
Finance Corp. v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., which perhaps better illustrates
the relitigation principle than the facts of Toucey.
37 The Judicial Code had been amended in 1911. Section 5 of the Act of
17933 became § 265 of the 1911 revision.
8 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139 (1941). The
Court refers to Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
The Court feels it was erroneously decided because the precedent for it,
Looney v. Eastern Texas R.R., 247 U.S. 214 (1918), was not a relitigation
case.
39

Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139 (1941).
401d. at 140-41.
41 The minority vindicated the Ben-Hur decision as precedent for the relitigation exception by attempting to salvage the Looney opinion. Where the
majority dismissed Looney because there had been no decree as such, the
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in enacting the Judicial Code of 1911 as an approval or implied acceptance of earlier legislation with its judicial gloss. 42 The minority
also pointed up the impracticality and inconvenience involved in forcing a 43party to litigate a suit when the outcome of the suit is perfectly
clear.
These differences in opinion led Congress in 1948 to undertake
a revision of the Judicial Code. Section 265 was significantly
amended; the bankruptcy provision was omitted
and the general
44
exception was inserted to cover all exceptions.
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 45

Although it is well known that the purpose of this re-codification
was to restore the law to its pre-Toucey status, 4 6 it became apparent
that Congress had not gone far enough; the revision still lacked
appropriate definition. For in spite of the fact that everyone knew
that Toucey had been repudiated, it was not clear whether Congress
had meant to reverse only the bare holding, or whether it had intended to manifest an attitude toward exceptions to the prohibition
in general. So, as had been necessary before, the Supreme Court
was called upon to settle what was basically the same problem-a
problem which seemingly transcended the factual situation of any
given case presented for decision.
The Development of Pre-emption in Labor Relations
While the federal government has observed a "hands-off" policy
with regard to state proceedings as a means of "achieving harmony
in our . . . complicated federalism," 47 a contrary approach has been
employed in the field of labor relations; Congress has obviated conflict by pre-empting the field. However, the complexity of national
legislation in this area and the equally complex case law demand a
preliminary examination of terms and concepts. Five threshold inquiries will be helpful.
minority felt that "a temporary injunction may well be likened to a decree
and entitled to the same protection against relitigation." Toucey v. New York
Life42 Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 151 (1914) (dissenting opinion).
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 144 (1914) (dissenting
opinion).
43 Ibid.
44 See Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958). The revision was also
made to conform with the all writs section, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958).
4528 U.S.C. §2283 (1958).
46 See Reviser's Note, note 44 supra.
47 Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375, 378 (1939).
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First, how far should federal regulation of labor extend? If
basic industries are to be subject to federal control, should those
that are un-basic be likewise subject to federal control?
Second, assuming that the federal government has chosen to
regulate some aspect of "labor-management relations," are the states
to be foreclosed from regulating other aspects of that relationship?
For example, if the federal government outlaws secondary boycotts,
can the state outlaw peaceful picketing?
Third, if federal regulation of "labor-management relations" is
to be exclusive, how shall we define the subject matter of this regulation? Certainly, an act of sabotage could, in a given instance,
constitute an "unfair labor practice" within the scope of federal regulation, but it would almost certainly be a tort and a crime, subject
to state regulation as well. Therefore, does the existence of a ground
for federal intervention exclude all local authority in the matter?
Fourth, should state courts and agencies be permitted to administer federal substantive law?
Fifth, which of the powers of government, legislative or judicial,
is to make law in this area? 48
Although it was aware of pre-emption principles 49 when passing the Wagner Act 50 and the Taft-Hartley Act,51 Congress has declined to establish a labor policy definitive of the rights of the federal
and state governments, but has left the solution of the problem in
the hands of the Supreme Court. The Court, as case-by-case adjudication over a ten-year period has shown, has likewise refused to make
any categorical declaration of labor policy, but has slowly evolved a
policy that has run the gamut from allowing state action as long as
it does not conflict with federal action,5 2 to ousting the states from
"areas of potential conflict." 53
One of the first areas foreclosed to state action concerned the
right of a state to interfere with an act specifically authorized by
Congress. 4 Thus, certain "concerted activities" protected by Sec48 See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HRv. L. REv.
1297, 1300-02 (1954).
49 See Isaacson, Federal Pre-Emption Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 INcD.
& LAn.
RE. REv. 391, 393 (1958).
50
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
52 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958).
52 See Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336
U.S. 301 (1949); International Union v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd. (the
Briggs-Stratton Case), 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
See also Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
53 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1958).
Accord, Guss v. Utah Lab. Rel. Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
4 If-ll v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (state licensing
provision disallowed).
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tion 7 of the Wagner Act "' were excluded from state control.5 6
Likewise, the states were foreclosed in certification cases, both where
the NLRB had refused certification,5 7 and where it would have if
called upon.5
It was in one of these certification cases, Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. New York Lab. Rel. Bd.,59 that the first stirrings of an
exclusion-without-conflict policy were heard:
When Congress has outlined its policy in rather general and inclusive terms
and delegated determination of their specific application to an administrative
tribunal, the mere fact of delegation of power to deal with the general matter,
without agency action, might preclude any state action if it is clear that
Congress has intended no regulation except its own.60
These first vibrations were given considerable amplification four
years later in Garner v. Teansters Union."' In that case an employer, engaged in interstate commerce, sought a state court injunction to prevent the union from engaging in conduct which was in
violation of state 0 2 and federal 6 law. In disallowing the state
remedy, the Court construed the intent of Congress in passing TaftHartley as an attempt to vest jurisdiction in the NLRB to the exclusion of state and federal courts, and maintained that since the
purpose of vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Board was to
achieve uniformity in labor policy, concurrent, albeit non-conflicting,
remedies 14 could not be permitted. Pre-emption was by no means
complete. The Court said that Taft-Hartley left "much to the states,

55"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities. . .

."

National

Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935). The Supreme
Court held some forms of conduct to be outside the scope of § 7. See, e.g.,
Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (mutiny); NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (violence); NLRB v. Sands Mfg.
Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (strikes in breach of contract).
56 See Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951)
(compulsory arbitration of public utilities); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454
(1950) (conflicting state statutory procedures).
57 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Lab. Rel. Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
5
8 LaCrosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
59330 U.S. 767 (1947).
60 Supra note 57, at 773.
61346 U.S. 485 (1953).
62 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6(2) (1952).
63 According to § 8(b) (2) of Taft-Hartley (the section allegedly violated),

it is an unfair labor practice for a union to cause an employer to discriminate
in his hiring practices to encourage or discourage membership in a labor union.
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958).
14 Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953): "The conflict lies
in remedies, not rights. .

.

. [W]hen two separate remedies are brought to

bear on the same activity, a conflict is imminent."

Id. at 498-99.
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though Congress has refrained from telling us how much." 65 The
trend, however, was dear; the "how much" was to diminish rapidly.
The policy was given further definition in Weber v. AnheuserBusch, Inc. 66 Here, the respondent filed a charge with the Board alleging a violation of section 8(b) (4) (D).67 This charge was dismissed. The respondent sought and received a state court injunction
on the ground that the union's conduct fell within the state's restraint
of trade statute. In dismissing the injunction, the Supreme Court said
that federal power cannot be curtailed "even though the ground of
intervention be different than that on which federal supremacy has
been exercised." 68 The Court reiterated the Garner principle that
Taft-Hartley does not exhaust the full sweep of legislative power
permitted by the commerce clause, but, in addition, cautioned the
states that they must decline jurisdiction ". . . where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within [federal law] . . . ,and where
the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal act, may be reasonably
deemed to come within ... that Act." 69
The Conflict of Section 2283 and Pre-emption-The
Amnalgamated Case
A week after the Weber case bad been decided, the conflicting
attitudes inherent in section 2283 and principles of pre-emption met
head-on in Andgamcated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros.70 The
petitioner had engaged in peaceful picketing of respondent's stores,
presumably to compel the latter's employees to join the union. The
respondent, charging the petitioner with common-law conspiracy and
restraint of trade, sought a state court injunction. The union attempted to have the case removed to the federal district court, but
jurisdiction was refused on the ground that, were the allegations
05 Id.at 488.
66 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
67 "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents: ....

(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer
to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform
any services, where an object thereof is: . . . (D) forcing or re-

quiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a
particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class
rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another
trade, craft, or class .

.

.

."

Labor-Management

Relations Act

(Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(1958).

6s
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
6od.
at 481.
70348 U.S. 511 (1955).
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true, only the NLRB could lawfully exercise jurisdiction in the
matter. The union then attempted to enjoin the state court action,
but the district court refused, citing section 2283. The Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that section 2283 applies, even where the
state court is "wholly without jurisdiction over the subject matter,
having invaded a field pre-empted by Congress." 71
The controversy centered around the construction to be given
the 1948 revision of the no-injunction provision. The majority,
through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, adhered to the "literal" view it had
employed in the similar Toucey case. This opinion relied on the
fact that there was no express authorization for an exception to be
made where Congress has chosen to occupy a field exclusively, and,
concluded that section 2283 was not a "statute conveying a broad
general policy for ad hoc application." 72 The Court further stated:
"... Congress made clear beyond cavil that the prohibition is not
to be whittled away by judicial improvisation .... Legislative policy
is here expressed in a clear-cut prohibition qualified only by specifically defined exceptions." 73
The minority, relying on the fact that the 1948 revision was a
legislative refutation of the Toucey decision, felt that the common
sense of the exception required an exception.7 4 The language of
Wells Fargo & Co. v,.Taylor 75 well illustrates the attitude of the
minority:
[The provision) . . .tends to prevent unseemly interference with the orderly
disposal of litigation in the state courts and is salutary; but to carry it beyond
that field would materially hamper the federal courts in the discharge of
duties otherwise plainly cast upon them by the Constitution and the laws of
Congress, which of course is not contemplated. As with many other statutory
provisions, this one is designed to be in accord with, and not antagonistic to,
our dual system of courts.7 6

A literal reading of the section offers no justification for an
exception.

The clause, "expressly authorized by . . . Congress," is

71Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 515
(1955). But see Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 511 (1944).
72Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., supra note 71, at 516.
7Id. at 514-16. But see Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
220 (1957) : "The frustration of superior federal interests that would ensue
from precluding the Federal Government from obtaining a stay of state court
proceedings except under the severe restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 would be
so great that we cannot reasonably impute such a purpose to Congress from
the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 alone. It is always difficult to feel confident
about construing an ambiguous statute when the aids to construction are so
meager, but the interpretation excluding the United States from the coverage
of the statute seems to us preferable in the context of healthy federal-state
relations." Id. at 226.
74 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., supra note 71, at 516
(dissenting opinion per Douglas, J.).
75Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920).
76 Id. at 183.
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merely a codification of the statutory exceptions and represents no
significant change in the law. 77 Likewise, the "protect or effectuate
its judgments" clause, although sufficient to reverse the Toucey
decision, 78 is inapplicable as there is no judgment to protect or
effectuate. Justice Frankfurter similarly dismissed the third ground
for exception, "in aid of its jurisdiction," by noting that there was
no jurisdiction to aid.79 Certainly, if "jurisdiction" is used as a
reference to jurisdiction in the exercised-control-over-a-physical-res
sense of the word, no serious argument can be made, for in
Amalgamated the Board was not called upon to act. However, even
if it can be established that the Bethlehem Steel-Garner-Weber line
of cases establishes a broader concept of jurisdiction, one which would
exclude the states even in the absence of federal activity, the wording
of 2283 still frustrates any attempt to justify an exception because
the jurisdiction which can be aided under the statute is the jurisdiction of the district court. The district courts, excluded from the
labor relations area along with the state courts and agencies, 0 can
enjoin state court actions by specific authorization of Taft-Hartley,
but only upon application by the Board.81 Clearly, an exception
granted in the Amalgamated case would have, itself, constituted an
exception to the then-existing long line of exceptions.
The appeal of Mr. Justice Douglas' "common sense" is compelling. Not only did the Amalgamated decision delimit the power
of the federal judiciary to give efficacy to Congress' plan of preemption, but it provided a neat avenue of escape for employers who
wished to circumvent the federal forum and take their chances with
a state court judge. Of course, the latter could refuse jurisdiction,
obeying the Garner rule, but this very fact of choice involves an2
element of discretion which was no doubt unintended by Congress.
The difficulties encountered in this area have been generated, at
least in part, by the Court's persistence in attempting to interpret
77 See MoopX, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE
0.03(49), at 410
(1949).
78 Id.at 411.
79
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 519
(1955).
so Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 491 (1953).
s1 "The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint.., charging
. an unfair labor practice, to petition any district court of the United
States .. .for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order." LaborManagement Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(j), 61 Stat. 149 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1958). See Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S.
501 (1954).
82 For instances where state courts have circumvented the Garner rule, see
Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297,
1317 rL85 (1954). On the same subject see Glushien, Federal Preemption in
Labor Relations, 15 FED. B.j. 4, 11 n.16 (1955), but also see the same article
at n.15 where the rule has been followed.
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the often-mythical "intent" of Congress.83 In both areas of preemption and federal injunctions of state proceedings, Congress has
refused to act and the Court has had to "draw the lines," but the
Court has drawn them by asking itself, paradoxically, where Congress drew them.8 4 The result, as already shown, has been somewhat less than satisfactory.
Total Foreclosure and the Landrum-Griffin Act
More problems were raised as the result of the Court's decision
in Guss v. Utah Lab. Rel. Bd.8 5 That case raised the question
whether the states were excluded where the Board had declined to
exercise its jurisdiction but had not ceded jurisdiction pursuant to
Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Section 10(a) provides,
inter alia, "the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency
of any state . . . to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases
: ... unless the provision of the [applicable] State . . . statute . . .

is inconsistent with the corresponding provisions of this Act or has
received a construction inconsistent therewith." 86 The Court held
section 10(a) to be the "exclusive means" by which the states could
act concerning matters entrusted to the Board by Congress. 87 Since
section 10(a) is simply a means of applying federal law in a state
forum, the message was clear: federal substantive law was to exclusively control labor relations. The effect of the decision was to
create a "no man's land": those employers who fell below the Board's
jurisdictional requirements 88 were literally without a remedy, absent
a cession agreement. This effect was by no means accidental; the
Court in Guss was well aware of this undesirable side-effect of its
decision,8 9 as was Congress when the Taft-Hartley amendments were
proposed. 90 The Court, however, felt constrained to honor the judgment of Congress in spite of whatever policy objection could be made
to the creation of the "no man's land." 91

83
84

See Glushien, sitpra note 82, at 4.
See Cox and Seidman, Federalismand Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REv.

211, 212 (1950).
85 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
86 This section also permits the Board to regulate unfair labor practices.
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(a), 61 Stat. 146
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
87 Guss v. Utah Lab. Rel. Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). Accord, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
88 The statutory authorization or the source of the Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices is only permissive; for administrative and budgetory
reasons, the power is not exercised exhaustively. The Board attempts, however, to exercise jurisdiction over those employers who have the greatest
impact on commerce.
89 Guss v. Utah Lab. Rel. Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957).
90 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
91 See note 89, supra.
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Although the controversial Guss opinion played a leading role
in the movement for legislative reform that became effective in 1959,92
the groundwork for the movement had been laid several years before. Centralization was taking its effect. Although desirable in
many ways, the disadvantages of exclusive national control of labor
problems became manifest. Centralization always breeds a certain
amount of rigidity. In the name of efficiency, generalizations are
made and identities are lost. The very nature of labor problems,
however, demands a familiarity with the parties and local conditions
that cannot properly be obtained by a centralized agency constrained
by necessity to adjudicate its cases in a quasi- stare decisis fashion
without making a substantial inquiry as to the exigencies of a particular case. 93 At the time Congress considered a modification of
a "home rule" movement
the Guss rule, there existed, therefore,
94
favoring local control of labor disputes.
Three solutions to the "no man's land" problem were proposed:
the so-called Administration bill embodied one approach, the KennedyErvin measure another, and the third solution, adopted as part of
the Senate bill, was basically a compromise between the other two.
The Administration approach, which was favored by most employer
groups, was to allow the Board to decline jurisdiction over cases
having an insubstantial effect on interstate commerce and to allow
state courts and agencies to assume jurisdiction over such discarded
cases.9 5 The Kennedy-Ervin bill, on the other hand, required the
Board to assert jurisdiction over all cases within its statutory jurisdiction, except in instances where a section 10(a) cession agreement
had been made.96 The third approach, or Prouty compromise, as it
is called, allowed State agencies to exercise jurisdiction over cases
declined by the Board, but the agencies had to apply federal subtheir decisions were made subject to review by
stantive law and
97
federal courts.
The solution finally adopted the Administration approach which
had been incorporated in the Landrum-Griffin bill that had won approval in the House, but one important qualification to the Board's
power to decline jurisdiction was made. The bill provided:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules
... decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class
92

The "no man's land" problem is generally considered to be the primary
motivation responsible for the enactment of § 701 of the Labor Reform Bill.
See BNA OPmaAoNs MA A.L, THE LAoR REFORm LAW (1959) (herein-

after cited as BNA), specifically at pp. 75-76, 222, 285-86, 452-63.
93 See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HAav. L. REv.
1297, 1304-07 (1954).
94 See generally, Jenkins, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor
Relations, 31 RocxY MT. L. Rzv. 315 (1959).
905 See BNA, at 76, 222.
0Id. at 285-86.
07 Td.

at 76.
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or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of
such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the
exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall not decline to
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959. (2) Nothing in this
Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any state
• . . from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which
98
the Board declines . . . to assert jurisdiction.

First of all, in addition to freezing the Board's maximum jurisdictional requirements,"9 the Act is an effective repeal of the proviso
to section 10(a), and as such, seemingly solves the "no man's land"
problem and the problem raised in the Amalgamated case as well.
It does, however, raise a problem of its own, for although employers hovering around the jurisdictional requirements might have
heretofore shown concern about the availability of a remedy, the Act
brings them no closer to certainty; the appropriate question is now,
"which remedy?" Moreover, the permissive language affords no
guarantee of remedy. In the absence of state action or a lowering
of the Board's standards, the employer is no better off than he was
before. The "no man's land" is still a fact to be reckoned with.
Probably the only solution to the problem involves a comprehensive change in the Board's standards. Presently, the Board attempts to treat almost all industries that "affect commerce" and
delimits itself by establishing arbitrary figures which represent the
minimum dollar-by-dollar impact on interstate commerce over which
the Board will exercise jurisdiction. Under such a system, two things
are certain: (1) the smaller you are, the better chance you have of
being excluded, and (2) anyone around the arbitrary figure, regardless of whether it is high, low, or otherwise, can legitimately express
grave doubts as to the substantive law applicable to him, as well as
to the courts open to him. This problem might be obviated if the
Board were to abandon its present policy of treating a few employers
in many industries and substitute a policy of treating many employers
9873 Stat. 519 (14 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. Nmvs 2953, 2983 (1959)).
99 The effect of sub-section (2) is to allow the Board to increase its jurisdiction, but not reduce it. The current dollar-by-dollar standards, in their
respective industries, are: (1) Non-Retail: $50,000 outflow or inflow, direct
or indirect; (2) Office Buildings: Gross revenue of $100,000 of which $25,000
or more is derived from organizations which meet any of the new standards;
(3) Retail Concerns: $500,000 gross volume of business; (4) Instrumentalities,
links, and channels of Interstate Commerce: $50,000 from interstate (or linkage)
part of enterprise or from services performed for employers in commerce;
(5) Public Utilities: $250,000 gross volume, or meet standard 1 (non-retail) ;
(6) Transit Systems: $250,000 gross volume; (7) Newspapers and Communication Systems: Radio, television, telegraph and telephone: $100,000 gross volume
-Newspapers: $200,000 gross volume; (8) National Defense: Substantial
impact on national defense; (9) Buiness in the Territories and District of
Columbia: D.C., Plenary; Territories, Standards apply; (10) Associations:
Regarded as single employer. See BNA, at 400.
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in a few industries. Under this vertical, rather than horizontal
approach the Board would select the industries which have the
greatest impact on commerce and treat them exhaustively, leaving
the others to the states. Dollar-by-dollar standards would be unnecessary, and, hence, much of the now-existing confusion and uncertainty would disappear.
The second, and perhaps most significant, effect of the Act is
that, as the first expression of the congressional will on the subject
in over a decade, it modifies the rule of exclusiveness which has
pervaded and controlled the subject during that time. As Garner and
subsequent cases had shown, uniformity was to prevail; conflict to
be avoided at all cost. The Act serves to qualify what the Court
had thought to be Congress' intent in passing Taft-Hartley, but how
much of a qualification it is will no doubt be determined only through
litigation. There are several possibilities: (1) the Act represents
a significant retreat from the Garner position and, as such, seriously
undermines the policy of pre-emption which has been followed since
the earliest comprehensive labor legislation, (2) the Act was passed
to meet the needs of a particular situation and will not be given effect
beyond the scope of that situation, (3) Congress doesn't care about
uniformity below the jurisdictional requirement level, or (4) Congress simply isn't as fastidious about exclusiveness as the Supreme
Court.
Other problems exist. On the authority of San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garnwn, 00 the states must decline jurisdiction
when conduct is "arguably" or "potentially" subject to Taft-Hartley
regulation. The new act only permits state intervention if there
has been a "clear determination" by the Board that no ground for
federal intervention exists. Whether this determination will be made
by the Board by "rule of decision" or by "published rules" remains
to be seen. However, if the state must remain idle pending a jurisdictional determination by the Board, isn't one of the primary advantages in local authority, namely, fast service, being wasted away,
particularly if the Board chooses the "rule of decision" method?
There is also a possible conflict on the question of what substantive
law will apply where the states can act. Unquestionably, if conduct
is within the Board's standards, and the Board fails to act (upon a
finding that no unfair labor practice exists, for example) the states
are nevertheless excluded; the act so provides. If, however, the
jurisdictional standards are not met, but the conduct falls within
the purview of Taft-Hartley, the Act is silent as to whether federal
or state law will govern. The rejection of the Prouty amendment
may be indicative of a congressional preference, but is certainly not
conclusive on the matter.
100 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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Concl4sion
The attempts to avoid conflict between federal and state judiciaries have been responsible for a disproportionate amount of litigation. It may well be one of the prices that must be paid for our
rather unique form of government; on the other hand, it may be
nothing more than the price that must be paid when a desirable end
is sought to be attained through diverse and incongruous means.
Congressional abnegation is undoubtedly responsible in at least a
small way. This is not to say that the courts should abdicate their
functions, but if the judges are going to base their decisions on the
"intent" of Congress, that intent should be manifested as explicitly
and, when necessary, as often as possible.
Congress has seemingly risen to the occasion with the LandrumGriffin Act. It is only urged that, if clarification of this legislation
is necessary, and it seems upon analysis that clarification will be
necessary, Congress again rise to the occasion and express such
clarification.

SCOPE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS

Introduction
One of the most perplexing problems presented by a commercial
arbitration clause is the scope of its applicability. The scope of the
agreement will be discussed with respect to the type of agreement
used and to the conflict of laws' difficulties presented by the choice
of forum. This latter point will be limited to a consideration of the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 1 and the New York Arbitration Act
of 1920.2 An attempt will be made to discover the boundaries of
such agreements within the confines of the law and within the agreement itself. This article will consider that problem as it appears in
a "future disputes" agreement, which is generally incorporated into
the primary contract,3 rather than in a submission which is a post19 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958).
The Federal Act as originally enacted made
"future disputes" agreements valid, irrevocable and enforceable. 43 Stat. 883

(1925).

2 N.Y. Crv. PPAc. Acr §§ 1448-69. The New York Act was amended in
1937 to provide that "future disputes" agreements were valid, enforceable
and irrevocable. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 341, at 882.
SAMERICAN ARin=AroN AssoCToN, COMMERCIAL ARmTRATI ON Rm.as 2
(1954). A standard "future disputes" arbitration agreement supplied by the
American Arbitration Association is as follows:

